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This study is an analysis of the interrelation of fundamentalism and the Internet. Contrary
to common assumptions that the Internet is a space of free communication and con-
struction of individuality – and contrary to the assumption of total control – the internal
structure of the Web is understood as creating a space structured by hierarchical struc-
tures fundamentalist internet use positively accepts. Two case studies look into the role of
fundamentalist video practices on theWeb exemplified by Salafist andHindutva internet
activities.
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Introduction
The still persistent idea the Internet may be a force that encourages democratic
developments just because it exists betrays its origin going back to the „good old
time“ of the virtual community of Howard Rheingold (1993) in the beginnings of
the Internet, still based on Bulletin Board Systems, Usenet groups, etc.
We might say the Arab Uprisings tell us this assumption may be true. But
looking at the uprisings after the fog of media uproar – and the usual somewhat
delayed academic reaction – lifted we may tell another story. The so-called
Facebook, Twitter, YouTube revolutions were revolutions that used all media
available (see Najar 2013) but were successful physically in the public space (see,
e. g., Dabashi 2012; Achcar 2013). Remember Tahrir place in Egypt or the Pearl
place in Bahrain! The tragedy of the Syrian people and the emergence of the
professional Internet or cyber warfare by entities like IS (Islamic State) demon-
strate that there is no democratic DNA built into online platforms – leaving aside
the mere fact we are talking about business companies that should be profitable.
So it is not surprising that fundamentalist movements, groups, and individuals
are successfully active online since there is no intrinsic democratic character of the
Web. It is not a case of “divided modernity” (Tibi 1985) – one part exploited by
fundamentalists, the technical one, and the other part, the democratic, enlight-
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ened one, ignored by them –, an idea that shows a normative misunderstanding of
technology as a mere tool to be used.
This does not mean I neglect the influence of the “mentalit- technique” (Si-
mondon 2006) on our perception of the world. I would rather like to introduce the
idea of the agency of technology (e. g., Latour 2005; Harman 2009) into the
discussion of fundamentalism and the Internet. The role of technology can be
understood as part of a network of actors including humans and technological
devices that may not be divided into isolated entities but related to each other.
Coming back to the question if the Internet can be regarded as a space of
freedom, Eugene Thacker wrote in the foreword to Alexander R. Galloway
Protocol (2004, pp. XIII–XIV) (!) on code, protocol, and networks:
Further, code is not necessarily language, and certainly not a sign. A code, in the sense
that Protocol defines it, is process-based: It is parsed, compiled, procedural or object-
oriented, and defined by ontology standards. A code is a series of activated mechanical
gears, or a stack of punched cards circulating through a tape-readingmachine, or a flow of
light-pulses or bits in a transistor or on silicon, or a vat of binding interactions between
DNA fragments.
When the book suggests that networks are not metaphors (or not merely metaphors),
the dichotomy is not one betweenmaterial and immaterial, but rather between two types
of “abstract”. On the one hand, there is an abstract use of the concept of networks
generally to signify any relationship between discrete entities. According to this usage,
just about anything can be seen as a network (and thus the overwhelmingly wide appli-
cation of certain network science or complexity approaches). But there is also another
meaning of “abstract”, one that is not the opposite of concrete.An abstract that is real is a
potential. (Henri Bergson uses the term “virtual” for the immanent unfolding of duration
as potentiality.) This is not the abstract use of network as a term, and neither is it an
abstraction of a technical term (themetaphorization of technological terms). Rather, this
abstract-but-real is the network that is always enacted and always about to enact itself.
One can pose the question: Is a network a network if it is not being used? Is the Internet a
network because of its fiber-optic cables, its usage, its data transfer, the standards for such
use, or the concepts that inform the development of network technology itself? Likely all
of these (Galloway 2004, pp. XIII–XIV).
But there is more to networks. Following these early insights again we should turn
to the protocols governing the Web:
If, in the discourses surrounding networks, the tropes of connectivity, collectivity, and
participation obscure the material practices of networks, Protocol points to several
principles for understanding networks as “a diagram, a technology, and a management
style”. To begin with, general talk about “networks”, dissociated from their context and
technical instantiation, can be replaced by a discussion of “protocols”. Every network is a
network because it is constituted by a protocol. If networks display any of the tropes
mentioned above, it is because there is an infrastructure that enables such properties to
emerge. Not networks, but protocols. Given this, Protocol can be read as a book of
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political economy. It argues for a methodological shift from a generalized understanding
of networks to a specified one, in which the protocological systems of TCP/IP and DNS
operate as what Foucault termed “political technologies” (Galloway 2004, p. XVIII).
These political technologies ensure control and management of networks, the
Internet in general. So – as we stated before – there is no intrinsic democratic
value of theWeb if we donot believe in themarketing hype of socialmedia orWeb
2.0, both concepts invented for marketing purposes, or participation and sharing,
etc. – just the same.
Turning to the users who use the network and by being a user enact the network
as mentioned above, our positive view of the Web and social media may be
disturbed again. Geert Lovink wrote about the nihilistic, self-centered worldview
expressed by bloggers some years ago (Lovink 2008). Although that!s not the full
story of blogging from a global point of view, reflecting a European/North
American experience rather, there is something true about it. Blogs and social
media are first of all an instrument to present yourself, your worldviews to an
audience listening to you and your elaborations.
The new forms of digital communication are shaped by a specific form of
individuality (Reichert 2008) it is said. I would like to say subjectivity instead of
individuality since users are better understood as subjected to technical and social
domination. Studies focusing on the “sovereignty of the individual spiritual
consumer” (Houtman / Aupers 2010, p. 7) tend to overlook these structures of
power. There are technical constraints: Users take these constraints for granted,
e. g., using 140 signs to express – not yourself! – but to put your communication
online on Twitter to give a very basic example.
But there are also social constraints – or to be more moderate: contexts. To
move away from the academic practice of privileging written ideas or anything
printed, we should remind us:
Social media sites are full of:
– Demographic information;
– Lists of friends, family, and associates;
– Logs of activities, preferences, and favorites;
– Maps showing places a person goes and how frequently;
– Time-stamped posts that indicate where a person was and when; and
– The content of the posts themselves, where people detail their thoughts, feelings, and
ideas (Golbeck 2015, p. 1; see also Golbeck 2015).
So when talking about social media, we are talking about many things. But I will
restrict my argument to the last three elements of the list: “thoughts, feelings, and
ideas”. Social media gave birth to a new media culture of practices of the self-
including guiding yourself, confession, book-keeping and a very precise form of
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benchmarking your performance, an experimental way of relating to yourself and
an esthetic of self-staging.
Social media sites provide an ambiance for new practices of subjectivity, cre-
ating new forms of centering on the self and new relations of power. Social media
expect the willingness of the user to give away more and more data and in-
formation to open for themawindowof participation. The user has to bewilling to
submit to the new regime of visibility. This means to accept the need to learn the
ever new forms of self-expression, to master these forms, and – on an advanced
level – to refine these forms.
The most recent form of this way self-staging may be the hype of selfies
(Reichert 2015).Wemay assume it will slowly fade away due to the fact it has been
appropriated by BarackObama et al., an act killing all forms of youth protest and
self-styling.But there is still anotherwayof self-styling not referring to age groups,
professional groups or social strata. It is part of larger realm of “digital religion”
(Hoover / Echchaibi 2014) that can be compared to the emergence of religion in
the context of older new technologies:
A prodigious scholarly and lay discourse has developed since at least the mid-1990s
focused on the ways that emergent digital technologies and practices might have im-
plications for religion and the meaning of “the religious”. From the beginning, much of
this speculation focused on the capacities of technologies to substitute for or compete
with received and known valences of religion. In this way, it was not that different from
the prior emergence of themediated broadcast religionwe nowknow as “televangelism”.
In that case as well, most commentary (both popular and scholarly) focused on how this
emergent phenomenon – and one that was brought about a “new technology” of the time
– (cable television) might have implications religion and its legitimated structures, con-
texts, and practices. It was difficult for observers to think about that new mediation of
religion outside received categories, terms, definitions, and metaphors. With the benefit
of hindsight, we can now see that televangelismwas not just “about” substituting for prior
practice. It was more profoundly a re-making of the expectations, meanings and contexts
through which religion is not only transmitted, received, shared and practiced but also
about new generativities, new forms of “the religious”, and their extents and boundaries.
Televangelism itself was not the point. It opened the door to re-imagining where religion
might be produced and by whom (Hoover / Echchaibi 2014, p. 2).
We may join Hoover / Echchaibi in their question:
[I]t became obvious to us thatmuch could be gained in our understanding by re-centering
our focus on “the religious digital” (thus broadly defined), its attributes, extents, and
limits. Rather than assuming received categories of religion, spirituality, or religious or
spiritual politics, or received physical or cultural geographies (the local/global dualism an
example of the former, and gender politics an example of the latter) what might we learn
by assuming that in digital religion we were looking at something on its own terms and its
own locations? (Hoover / Echchaibi 2014, p. 5).
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So we are talking about digital religion:
Digital religion is religion that is constituted in new ways through digital media and
cultures.Hoover highlights that thismay lead to a newunderstanding of religion, one that
is rooted in unique understandings and experiences of mediation of meaning via digital
technology. This recognizes that the reformulation of existing religious practices has both
online and offline implications. It also means digital culture negotiates our under-
standings of religious practice in ways that can lead to new experiences, authenticity, and
spiritual reflexivity. Based on this I suggest that the term “digital religion” describes the
technological and cultural space that is evokedwhenwe talk about howonline and offline
religious spheres have become blended or integrated.We can think of digital religion as a
bridge that connects and extends online religious practices and spaces into offline reli-
gious contexts, and vice versa. This merging of new and established notions of religious
practice means digital religion is imprinted by both the traits of online culture (such as
interactivity, convergence, and audience-generated content) and traditional religion
(such as patterns of belief and ritual tied to historically grounded communities)
(Campbell 2013, pp. 3 f.).
Fundamentalist movements active on the Web are a particular form of digital
religion.Wewill look into fundamentalismonline by focusing on videos. There are
other areas of research on online fundamentalism, e.g., the use of memes (see
Bellar et al. 2013), but still videos seem to be the most influential online practice
of fundamentalists.
1. Fundamentalism
To give a kind of definition, I would like to turn to Martin Riesebrodt (see Rie-
sebrodt 2005). He stated that contrary to the widespread view that fundamen-
talists are pursuing political aims we may insist on the fact that most fundamen-
talist groups organize themselves as subcultures or a kind of communal organi-
zations separating itself symbolically or in space from other groups or cultural
milieus. These communal organizations and subcultures try to create circum-
stances allowing them to follow their lifestyle without any restrictions and to
educate the following generations. So in most cases the shaping of subjectivity
through a pious way of living the cultivation of a specific religious ethos is at the
center of fundamentalist activity.
2. Piety Movement in Egypt
For a case study we may look at the piety movement of women in Egypt from the
1980s onward:
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According to participants, the mosque movement had emerged in response to the per-
ception that religious knowledge, as a means of organizing daily conduct, had become
increasingly marginalized under modem structures of secular governance. The move-
ment!s participants usually describe the impact of this trend on Egyptian society as
“secularization” ("almana or "alma¯niyya) or “westernization” (tagharrub), a historical
process which they argue has reduced Islamic knowledge (both as amode of conduct and
a set of principles) to an abstract system of beliefs that has no direct bearing on the
practicalities of daily living. In response, the women!s mosque movement seeks to edu-
cate ordinary Muslims in those virtues, ethical capacities, and forms of reasoning that
participants perceive to have become either unavailable or irrelevant to the lives of
ordinary Muslims. Practically, this means instructing Muslims not only in the proper
performance of religious duties and acts of worship but, more importantly, in how to
organize their daily conduct in accord with principles of Islamic piety and virtuous be-
havior.
Despite its focus on issues of piety, it would be wrong to characterize the women!s
mosque movement as an abandonment of politics (see Mahmood 2005, p. 4).
To rephrase the approach ofRiesebrodt, wemay say that fundamentalism is away
of organizing itself as subcultures or communal organizations having political
implications for the society at large. Turning to fundamentalism and themedia we
may look into
Charles Hirschkinds of pre-Tahrir Cairo The Ethical Landscape. It is not an account of
ideas and beliefs, but an analysis of exchanges that belong to a particular way of life. He
asks how the enormously popular practice of listening to sermons in Cairo shaped reli-
gious sensibilities […] Throughout Islamic history attending the Friday sermon has been
an important part of – male – Muslim subject formation. Hirschkind analyzed the re-
ception of sermons as an active process, one in which the faithful listener cultivated his or
her ability to attend. Listening to sermons in modern Cairo is no longer confined to the
Fridaymosque and it is no longer a one-off experience. Taped sermons can now be heard
numerous times, in many urban contexts, without supervision. Hirschkind describes this
with the felicitous phrase “undisciplined discipline” (Asad 2012, pp. 54 f.).
Hirschkind!s accounts of the pious movements in Egypt describes how the prac-
tice of cassette listening promoted an acoustic sensibility opposed to the former
state!s obsession with spatial control, as well as to the nouveaux riches who had
withdrawn in their clean, orderly gated communities. Contained in this opposition
was an unending struggle for how “real Islam” is to be lived. What Hirschkind
calls a “counter-public” is thus an Islamic space of moral distancing from the
hegemonic religious-secular order. Many Islamists, he tells us, regarded the re-
gime of discipline as helping to develop a responsiveness that might moderate, if
not totally negate, the seductions of neoliberal consumer culture (see Asad 2012,
p. 55).
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So we may look at fundamentalist, pious subcultures and groups as entities
creating new forms of subjectivity creating the community again and again by
perpetuating the fundamentalist ethos and using modern media, in his case study
audiocassettes, CDs; we now may find DVDs or Blue Ray discs.
What makes the Internet especially fit for these purposes is the general
structure of Internet practice as management of the self and the general “undis-
ciplined discipline” of the users. Practicing this undisciplined discipline may in-
clude attending prayer groups, reading circles, etc. but using the platforms of the
Web enables the new fundamentalist subjects to subject themselves to the dis-
cipline of the fundamentalist protocol in the guise of freely choosing – individually
– between what is available on the fundamentalist media market. This ability to
choose marks the modernity of fundamentalism.
One new fundamentalist set of movements emerging from the Islamic piety
movements of the 1970s and 1980s referred to before is Salafism. Salafists have
been very active in appropriating the new media, esp. satellite TV and the
Internet. A paradigmatic case is a German Salafi group running the site
diewahrereligion.org.
3. Salafism
Salafism inGermany (influencingAustria, too) have attracted some interest in the
last years motivated by security concerns. Several studies tried to analyze this
phenomenon (Schneiders 2014, Ceylan / Jokisch 2014, Said / Fouad 2014).Wewill
focus on the website mentioned above. The group running this site is known for
the campaign of distributing copies of a German translation of the Quran in
Germany, Austria, and Switzerland. It is slowly internationalizing distributing,
e. g., in Sweden (https://www.facebook.com/diewahrereligion; January 9, 2016, in
Malmö).
The site is linked to an active Facebook account and a YouTube channel
(https://www.youtube.com/user/Allahsreligion/) offering many videos. Central to
all these sites is the campaign of distributing free copies of the Quran. The older
version of the homepage had a separate section for videos (see Lohlker 2016) now
available on the YouTube channel.
The videos may be categorized as mission videos, including verbal and other
attacks on the people distributing the Quran, conversions to Islam, and religious
issues.
The mission videos try to attract the audience through the performance of the
Salafi missionaries to a deeper study of the contents provided to the people
passing by. The images of the video cause an effect of a shock transmitted through
the images showing people sacrificing their time, their energy to the Salafi cause.
By viewing these scenes, the audience gets attracted to the religiously imbued
fundamentalist content brought close to him or her. Even if we don!t have an
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esthetic shock, in this case, wemay apply Benjamin!s notion of the surreal to these
videos (see below).
The videos have to submit to the protocols of the platform YouTube and the
users are left with three options due to the structure of this platform (e.g., Von-
derau 2009): 1) viewing, 2) viewing and embedding the video in self-produced
Web content, or 3) commenting upon. Again, the freedom of the Web is easily
discernible as a guided freedom.
Thedemarcation of boundaries is to be seen in several of the videos on religious
issues criticizing non-acceptable way of living, acting, or believing definingwhat is
not allowed among the members of the community. On the other hand behavior
acceptable for the group is aptly described. The community building effect is
reinforced by showing the public activities during the distribution of the Quran
campaign.
All these effects are presented in a top-down way leaving to the viewer the re-
performance of the performance seen on the screen, to make the digital code
behind the digital icon (see below) visible in his life.
Other Salafi preachers are active online. A renowned Salafi preacher from
Mauritania, Muhammad al-Hasan Ould al-Dedew (see Salem 2013, p. 93; and his
official page at http://dedewnet.com/), established a YouTube channel in 2009.
As of November 2012, videos at this channel had been viewed nearly 500,000 times. The
videos, most of them capturing remarks the Shaykh gave to live audiences, cover topics
such as endowments […], hajj, and various fatwas the Shaykh has issued. In many videos
the Shaykh speaks in modern standard Arabic […], rather than the Hassaniyya dialect
that is widespread in Mauritania. This linguistic choice demonstrates his facility in the
language of classical scholarship and makes his words intelligible to a broad Arab au-
dience (Thurston 2012, p. 66).
The videos of this Salafi preacher are disseminated through several channels now,
adapted to other languages using subtitles (e.g., German subtitles at the channel
GermanyRida). Most of the videos present speeches, interviews, and the preacher
participating in discussions. This way of distributing content is muchmore putting
religion online than creating online creation a classification developed by Hel-
land: “A distinction between online religion (where the religious activity actually
occurred in the online environment) and religion online (where the medium was
used as a tool to facilitate religious activity in the "offline! world)” (see Helland
2012). Helland stated when studying
online activity associated with Tibetan Buddhism and the Tibetan Government in Exile,
it became very clear that many people within this tradition do religion online by watching
the Dalai Lama perform ritual activities and communicate information about their re-
ligion – of course many religious traditions function in this way. This activity is clearly
“religion online” and the flowof information is absolutely fromone-to-many.However, it
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is also a way of “doing” religion, much like sitting at the feet of the guru to receive a
blessing or teachings, it is a powerful form of religious engagement and one that happens
online now much more frequently with the development of new technologies that can
broadcast HD and HP (high powered) sermons from charismatic religious leaders and
teachers (Helland 2012).
Although publishing videos of Salafi preachers online may be seen as a deficient
version of religion restricting the audience to listening and viewing these videos, it
is another way of “doing” religion that leads to offline action published again
online as in the case of diewahrereligion.
Other instances of creating an online context for “doing” religion, Salafi style,
may easily be found, e.g., theYouTube channel salafmedia of the Somali preacher
Maxamed cAbdi Umal (see also https://www.facebook.com/salafmedia1) was set
up in 2011 and has been viewed (January 15, 2016) 3,088,204 times. Most of the
videos are filmed versions of his speeches, allowing the followers to attend the
lectures virtually and thus watching the performance of the preacher, his way of
“doing” religion.
Sometimes videos are used for a restaging of Salafi speakers who have died
without being filmed. A prominent Salafi theoretician, Muhammad Na¯sir ad-Dı¯n
al-Alba¯nı¯ (died 1999) (see http://alalbany.me/), has published many audio-
cassettes (see http://alalbany.me/), some of them nowpresented as a videowith or
even without visual elements to accompany his verbal statements. This is a fine
example for readily submitting to the new regime of visuality on theWeb. Avideo
biopic Sheikh Nasiruddeen al-Albani – the Albanian (other titles are available)
gives a narration of al-Alba¯nı¯ thus giving the opportunity to construct a histor-
ically founded identity as a Salafi to the viewer.Another Salafi tradition is created
when prominent Saudi scholars, al-Alba¯nı¯, and others are presented together
reciting the first chapter of the Quran (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sp
Cl52THKF0).
A Dailymotion channel presents a slightly different image of Salafism: ama-
touab. The usual videos of – all Arabs – preachers are available. A very special
video shows the texts of the scholarly books on niqa¯b, the face-covering veil,
following the reader line after linemaking it possible for the viewer to perform his
own reading. Salafi couples are filmed as an example of family life with a song as
background music sung by women. Other videos visualize the story told in a
Hadith, a tradition of the deeds and sayings of the prophet, situated in a nostalgic
bedouin setting. A capella songs are played with dynamic graphics as the visual
element; a girls choir performs a song in praise of the Muslim veil. But videos of
other songs are available not evidently conveying a Salafi message – unless the
absence of the wife a family setting may be an indicator.
“Doing” religion may have a more public aspect when we look at videos
showing, e. g., public gatherings of Tunisian Salafists with a group of men per-
forming some martial arts moves in front of an audience acclaiming this per-
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formance. The Salafi speakers are seen waiting for their part of the event (https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=49hsA5EzFX8).
Videos are also used as a means to create a new brand of Salafism through the
media, stressing the need to understand the agency of technology. In her case
study of the YouTube channel salafimedia – not available at the time of writing –
Stadlbauer writes:
Salafimedia identifies as the most authentic and most modern Muslim community
(ummah), as demonstrated in their most recent video posting, entitled The New Salafi-
media Rebrand Video 2013: 4th Year Relaunch. Describing their new identity as re-
branded and Salafism as a brand indexes marketing or business strategies – a new brand
usually sells a new outlook. Furthermore, employing the metaphors of “rewriting the
script” and “going back to the drawing board” further communicates the members!
desires to reorganize and change their story, more so since they increasingly have to
respond to accusations of radicalization by the UK government. Salfimedia becomes a
platform for social action, and their beliefs become politicized.
The rebranding video has two parts: the first part presents action sequences and
special effects that accompany importantmessages. For instance, the video begins
with the image of a lion, later explained by “MayAllahmake us have the roar of a
lion, with the heart of a lion”. Text runs through the screen, urging the audience to
“believe in it, live by it, be ready to die for it”, where it refers to the promise of
Allah, the call, or the revelation. In the transition to the second part, a wild black
horse gallops over a dark, war-torn, post-apocalyptic world accompanied by
lightning flashes, symbolizing both the destruction of a corrupt world and the
renewal and power through Salafi Islam.
In the second part, four lecturers scold an imaginary Muslim audience about having
forgotten the core message of the Prophet Muhammad from 1400 years ago. For special
effects, superimposed animations of gunshots are fired through the screen and followed
by explosions. Themen project Salafism as “the truth and nothing but the truth” and they
tell their followers that they are the best ummah. Especially prominent are the speakers!
repeated calls to “enjoin the good and forbid the evil”, highlighting the binary opposi-
tions between the Salafis (the good) and theWestern unbelievers or kufar (the evil). Only
through a radical reorientation to the way of the salaf can the global ummah regain
agency, strength, power, and victory. The video is an urgent wake-up call for misguided
Muslims (Stadlbauer 2013).
This attempt to create third spaces (Hoover / Echchaibi 2014) demonstrates the
potential of online videos, even if we do not share the worldview of the people
running this video channel. It means the videos as a rebranding mechanism,
Stadlbauer taking up the title of the video mentioned above, making possible the
creation of new form of Salafism not seen before. All the videos discussed here
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hint at an audience interested in creating their own – Salafi – subjectivity sub-
mitting to the “undisciplined discipline” mentioned above.
An – again: under-researched – aspect of Salafi video activity online is the
existence of many religious satellite TV channels. What makes the specific Salafi
branding of these channels?
As a[n] […] approach that places strong emphasis on literally mimicking the pious an-
cestors, looks are very important. Salafis viewmannerisms of the Prophet, wearing a long
beard for example, as a constant reminder of their commitment that will help avoid sin.
These choices are reflected visually on Salafi stations: preacherswear long beards and the
same type of clothing that the first generation of Islam would have worn, whereas
preachers affiliated with the Brotherhood or who define themselves as non-Salafi wear
less conspicuous robes or a suit and tie. The near total exclusion of women from the
airwaves reflects Salafism!smore rigid views on gender relations – a clear distinction from
non-Salafi media. For example, on al-Resalah, a Kuwait-based non-Salafi satellite sta-
tion, several female Egyptian ulema, who appear on-air wearing only the hijab, are listed
as “stars of al-Reselah”. […] Another feature of Salafi networks is an unwillingness to
give platforms to non-Salafi viewpoints: while other religious stationsmay give airtime to
Salafi preachers they disagreewithwhen given the chance, Salafis do not return the favor.
(Field / Hamam 2009, p. 5)
But there are many other examples of the branding of a fundamentalist world-
view, not a rebranding. One of them is Hindutva for the realm of Hinduism.
4. Hindutva
The Hindu-nationalist movement called Hindutva is a prominent case demon-
strating the importance of Internet activities for fundamentalist movements.
There are some discussions whether the concept of fundamentalism may be ap-
plied in this case since Hinduism is understood as a conceptually non-exclusive
religion without fundamental texts as in the monotheist religions. Referring to
Riesebrodt again, we may say Hindutva as an exclusive movement based on a
selective relecture of a religious tradition shaping the subjectivity of its followers
through a pious way of living based on the cultivation of a specific religious ethos.
This allows us to describe Hindutva is a fundamentalist movement – much more
political as in the first case study (e.g.,Arvind 2002; Six 2006). Someauthorsmake
a distinction between religious Hindu fundamentalism and political Hindu fun-
damentalism (e.g., Ceming 2004).
A researcher argued, “the internet, in particular, seems to be the chosen me-
dium for the Hindu nationalists working in technology to promote Hindutva”, as
they “help maintain over five hundred VHP Web sites through which to spread
their messages about Hindutva, Hindu history, and Muslim-bashing” (Chopra
2006, p. 194).
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Two key principles have been identified that inform the audiovisual rhetoric of
Hindu nationalism:
First, the video demonstrates that the Hindutva politics of representation is based on the
technique of “intervisuality”, whereby meaning emerges from the dynamic interplay of
aesthetic and symbolic spaces and social practices. Second, Hindutva rhetoric relies on
the use of “wish-images”, through which imaginary “think-spaces” are opened that en-
able its ideologues to generate ideas of a crisis-ridden imagined community of Hindu
nationals against the backdrop of a Golden Age and a utopian future (Brosius 2002,
p. 265).
Brosius continues:
I have highlighted the Hindutva project to use video as an instrument for political
transformation. It does so through the mimetic appropriation of already circulating
narratives, iconographies and genres from the sphere of popular visual representation,
and political and religious practices. Newmeaning is evolved when familiar imagery and
narratives are situated in the new or altered context of dichotomies such as crisis and
solution, exile/imprisonment and liberation, and stereotypes of “tolerant Hindus”, “ag-
gressive Muslims”, the unresponsive state, and so on. Amidst this process of connection-
making and -breaking in the videos, Hindutva spokesmen attempt to translate the ab-
stract idea of nationalism into a “natural” object to be addressed through the intimate
familial relationship of deshbhakti. Their dynamic practice of inter visuality not only
connects different aesthetic realms but creates references to an alleged primordial,
shared national past through language that is interpenetrated, via wish-images, with a
desire for utopia.
However, the terrain of self-representation is a contested one, as Hindutva repre-
sentatives have discrepant ideas about communication and the disciplining of imagined
audiences (for example, regarding the priority of text versus image). Indoctrination via
spectacle, entertainment, and “information”, enshrined in the dense aesthetic and sty-
listic network ofmontage,magical realism, andmimesis, are themeans throughwhich the
Hindutva ideologues attempted to “tickle” their audiences during the height of the
Ayodhya campaign. The Hindutva rhetoric of people!s empowerment is based on the
power of desire, or temptation: While imagery, narratives and script create visions of a
potent and “able body” of Hindu brethren, on the one hand, the viewers are “tamed” by
metamorphosing them into disciplined, infantile devotee-machines and selfless martyrs
on the battlefield of nationalism […] (Brosius 2002, p. 292).
The creation of martyrs may be seen in the videos of the YouTube channel hin-
dutvainus (https://www.youtube.com/user/hindutvainus/videos) showing training
sessions of the Hindutva organization RSS demonstrating its “well-disciplined
discipline” and the necessity to fight. Brosius analyzed the structure of Hindutva
online activities from another angle in her study on HinduUnity.org:
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We can venture to say that the Web provides a place for the creation of a new form of
intercultural and transnational iconography, even to those committed to militant na-
tionalism and opposed to intercultural dialogue. In building this dynamic repertoire of
images and visual rhetoric, symbols of the threatening Other are “magically fixed”
through the strategies of appropriation, defamation, or humiliation. We are reminded
here of a key text by Evelyn Kallen entitled “Hate on the Net” […]. Kallen distinguishes
three interconnected means of using the Web as a “hate-mongering” tool: An “invali-
dation myth” defines the target group (e.g. the Muslims) as inferior/dangerous; an “in-
validation theory” provides the ideological framework, arguments and “evidence” to
rhetorically attack minority groups; and finally as “a platform for organized community
action”, a hate website urges and provides the communicative means for the “threatened
community” to take steps to aggressively counter or eliminate the purported threat.
The aim of HU is to create both an actual and an imagined virtual brotherhood of
militant Hindus and to claim rights to representation over this homogenized community.
The consumers of this vision are otherwise physically out of reach to each other and to the
prime movers of HU (social encounters happen predominantly on the net; real world
encounters within HU seem rare). The visitors to the HU site can then be seen as an
audience responding to the facilitation of a communication platform, responding to
projections of Hindus seen and shown as victims, judges, or soldiers. Through various
performative strategies, the affective components of the possibility to participate in this
world of victims, judges, vigilantes and soldiers, and the urge to “make an impact” on this
world, are evoked. The tenor of all the articles and images available, on and through the
HU homepage, is one of ongoing confrontation and crisis: Hindutva, for the makers and
producers of HU, is the organized, aggressive, cohesive articulation of what it is to be a
Hindu today, and is the only way to protect Hindu identity against national and inter-
national threats. HU creates credibility, and thus authority, by entangling the visitor in a
claustrophobic space, seemingly filled with countless details of “the evidence of the
historical and ongoing humiliation, torture and abuse of Hindus”. And having done so, it
puts forward what it calls “justified” strategies to encounter the cause/s of this crisis.
Even though most of the images, rhetoric and ideological content put on display on a
website like HinduUnity are not new, and can be traced back to the writings of Sangh
Parivar ideologues such as Veer Savarkar orGolwalkar, it is the ways in which the images
are presented and combined that constitutes a strange amalgam of virtual reality/ac-
tuality, or, as I indicated in the title of this article, surreality. I employ the term surrealism
with some deliberation. I use it here in reference to two issues which I find are at stake in
the Hindu Right!s use of the internet: One is the conscious alignment of two or more
different images, each drawn from different “real” locations or contexts within one
composition, creating through the juxtaposition of two already familiar materials a
strange feeling of augmented and renewed familiarity that causes a heightened, uncanny
sense of reality. The second issue emerges from the idea of montage and pulls in cultural
historian Walter Benjamin!s work on media aesthetics and propaganda. Benjamin!s
notion of the surreal proposed that the effect of a shock transmitted through image
consumption brings to a standstill the free flow of associations. The aesthetic shock
freezes perception and at the same time heightens our senses; it creates an aura bymeans
of which the necessary critical distance of the viewing subject succumbs to the con-
centrated transmission of ideologically imbued content. The magical condensation of
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meaning embodied in images brings the viewed object close to us, renders it as if it were
tactile, and makes available to our desires and fears what otherwise remains abstract and
distant. Fetishization (which pulls one closer to the object or feeling desired) and xeno-
phobia (which repels and makes more distant the “other”) are thus simultaneously
central to the virtual surrealism of HinduUnity […] (Brosius 2004, pp. 140 f.).
This surreality may be seen in a less elaborate form in the Salafi videos discussed
before. Due to the aversion to pictorial representation in the Salafi varieties of
Islam it has to be constructed as a series of speech acts. For Hindutva, it is im-
portant to notice the impact of the rhetorics and visual productionwill have on the
individual activists who are to follow the ideals propagated in the videos being
subjected to the effects of the media and only free to perform the message.
One aspect of Hindutva video practice is still to be mentioned. At the website
sarvarkar.org dedicated to the ideologue of the movement V. D. Sarvarkar
(id. 1966) has a video section. In this section are several videos starting with a clip
of Sarvarkar himself and offering some visual documents and documentary films.
Wemay read this as the construction of a history of themovement and its founder
using videos as a means to build an identity on the foundational relecturer of the
religious tradition. A very active Twitter account of the journal Hinduism Today
(see https://twitter.com/HinduismToday) highlights another aspect of Hindutva
online activity.
Turning to the performative aspect of religion online, we may look into a
phenomenon that is specific for online Hinduism: the Hindu temples on theWeb.
Although these sites may not endorse the program of Hindutva, they are never-
theless a focus of Hindutva followers.
Analytically speaking, three “types” constitute the domain ofHindu temples on theWeb:
(1) the temple homepage, which functions as the online home for a physical temple; (2)
the commercial puja site, which facilitates rituals services in prominent temples on behalf
of their clients for a fee; and (3) the Hindu discourse site, which presents the temple as a
virtual space for mediation, prayer and explication of Hindu religious discourse (Mal-
lapragada 2010, p. 110).
The author argues
that Hindu temples sites demonstrate the emergence of what I call “desktop deity cul-
ture” constituted through the practices of digital darshan, online rituals, and virtual
Hinduism. These Web practices, in turn, exemplify the “remediation” (Bolter and Gru-
sin) of new media conceptualizations of digitality, network capital flows, hypertextuality
and virtuality as they are articulated to ideas of the Hindu image, embodied ritual
practice and the temporal and spatial logic of the temple as a sacred place (Mallapragada
2010, p. 111).
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These temple sites may be understood as “repurposing "older! media forms such
as photographs of deities, Hindu calendar art, the analog sacred texts and temple
books, audio tapes of religious discourse through their textual and discursive
practices of representing online temples” (ibid.).As such they fit into the category
of performing religion online and can be appropriated by everybody participating
as far as the structure of the site allows participation. Again these sites are do-
minated by the protocol or the code of the site. This domination through protocol
is muchmore evident in another online practice not explored here: digital games.
A first study on the first India-produced digital gameHanuman: BoyWarrior (see
Zeiler 2014) has opened up the Asian sphere of gaming and religion. Hindutva
online activities especially try to reach the US diaspora, another aspect not to be
discussed here (see Therwath 2012).
5. Repetitive Performance
An added value of fundamentalist internet activity is the possibility to perform
again and again the true message of god, the repetitive effect of internet videos,
e. g., lends itself easily to a repetitive performance, staging and embodiment of the
fundamentalist ethos and subjectivity or the protocol structuring fundamentalist
subcultures and communities.
Another added value of Internet activity is the fact that persons acting as
leaders of communal congregations act today as actors in front of an audience
feeling as part of a performance blurring the distinction between producing and
produced (see Lohlker 2016). So any fundamentalist actor understands himself or
herself as performing the fundamental ethos of his or her group, not only re-
producing it.
Is the Internet fundamentalist? Evidently not! But technological structures
and technological practices of the self-lend itself can easily be used by funda-
mentalist individuals, groups, organizations, and networks. Boris Groy con-
tributed to this discussion when speaking about “the digitized religion” and the
role of videos (for a preliminary analysis see Lohlker 2016):
However […], the new religious movements operate primarily through the Internet by
means of digital and not mechanical reproduction. During the last decades, video has
become the chosen medium of contemporary religious propaganda and is distributed
through different TV channels, the Internet, commercial video stores,1 etc. This is es-
pecially true in the case of the most recent, most active, and even aggressive religious
movements. […] This use of the video as the major medium of self-presentation among
1 Wemaynote theEurocentric bias in notmentioning the role of audio-cassettes and
radio in non-“Western” environments (see for a case study in Egypt Hirschkind 2006)
(R.L.).
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different religious movements is a relatively new phenomenon. […]
At this point, I would argue that the use of video as the principal medium by con-
temporary religious movements in intrinsic to the message of these movements. Neither
is it external to the understanding of the religious, as such, as it underlies this use. This is
not to suggest, following Marshall McLuhan, that here the medium is the message but
rather, as I would argue, that themessage has become themedium – a particular religious
message has become the digital code.
Digital images have the propensity to generate, to multiply, and to distribute them-
selves almost anonymously through open fields of the contemporary means of commu-
nication. […] digitalization seems to guarantee a literal reproduction of a text or image
more effectively than any other known technique. Naturally, it is not so much the digital
image itself as the image file, the digital data which remains identical through the process
of its reproduction and distribution. However, the image file is not an image – the image
file is invisible. The digital image is an effect of the visualization of the invisible digital
data (Groys 2011, p. 27).
The digital image can be seen only being performed. By performing something it
is always interpreted or even misused through interpretation. This hints at the
fundamental fallacy of fundamentalism claiming to return to the original meaning
by constructing a part of its religious tradition as the original version without
being aware of its technique of interpretation. The immutability of the digital file
does not guarantee the immutability of content since it has to be transformed into
human practice – performed (see Lohlker 2016). “In this respect, the digital image
functions as a Byzantine icon – as a visible representation of invisible digital data.
The digital code seems to guarantee the identity of different images that function
as visualization of this code” (Groys 2011, p. 29). And in this respect, we may
understand videos on the Web as a paradigmatic representation of the funda-
mentalist belief in the immutability of the sources of religious traditions – affected
by the same problems fundamentalisms has to meet in offline reality. But again:
videos are not fundamentalist per se. If the structures of video production, dis-
semination, transformation and perception on the Web that lend itself to a fun-
damentalist use it is possible to imagine a non-fundamentalist video production.
That is beyond the framework of this article.
To think about a new reflected practice of using the Internet is still to be done,
be it in religious practices or any other form. We should remind ourselves of the
problems of expressing the relation to a non-human reality in human language in
an older communication system, oral and literal (see Giesecke 1992).
In the beginnings of research on religion and the Internet, there was a problem
concerning the “textual character of so much computer-mediated communica-
tion. Can religious experience be embodied in words alone?” (Dawson 2006,
p. 17) Now we are facing the problem of religious practice embodied in moving
pictures on the screen to be reflected upon in the context of the technical objects
(see Simondon 2014) in their interrelations to human actors.
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